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FOREWORD
As this monograph goes to press, the nuclear
agreement negotiated between Iran and the so-called
P5+1—the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council consisting of the United States,
France, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, plus Germany—is the subject of heated debate within Washington. The negotiations that produced the agreement perhaps best exemplify the efforts by the Barack
Obama administration to use diplomacy to address
the most vexing security challenges of the day. The
United States and Iran have struggled to overcome
mutual hostility and distrust stemming from the 1953
coup against the Mohammad Mossadegh government
and the 1979-80 hostage crisis, not to mention Teheran’s use of Hezbollah as a proxy against American
ally Israel. Yet despite this, the administration persisted over several years to first intensify and broaden
economic sanctions against Iran, and then to engage in
painstaking negotiations with an authoritarian country that routinely and methodically employs antiAmerican rhetoric.
In many ways, this shift in approach toward greater reliance on diplomacy—or, as Dr. John R. Deni puts
it, this rebalancing—represents a marked contrast
with the approach of President Obama’s predecessor.
The administration of President George W. Bush was
frequently accused of favoring the use of unilateral
military power over multilateral diplomacy and development as the primary tool of American national
security. Indeed, the effort to rebalance the threelegged stool of U.S. national security has been a hallmark of the Obama years, as Dr. Deni persuasively
argues in this monograph. In Dr. Deni’s view, this

ix

defining characteristic of President Obama’s foreign
policy overshadows in scope, depth, and importance
the other “rebalance” most often associated with the
44th President—that is, the rebalance to the Pacific.
However, Dr. Deni argues that the tragedy of
President Obama’s rebalance toward diplomacy and
development is not that it represents an America in retreat, but rather that the rebalance has not succeeded.
Despite unambiguous rhetoric, official pronouncements, and policies all aimed at rebalancing toward
diplomacy and development and away from defense,
in fact, there is much evidence to indicate that U.S.
foreign and national security policy remains militarized, perhaps overly so. Nonetheless, even in a tale
of failure, there are important implications not simply for U.S. national security, but for the role of the
military as well. Dr. Deni skillfully draws out these
implications, connecting broad strategic trends with
the most likely, most compelling consequences for
the Department of Defense and the U.S. Army specifically. By drawing these inferences effectively, Dr.
Deni is able to offer implementable recommendations
to senior policymakers. For these reasons, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College is
pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to
the unfolding national security debate about the role
of the U.S. military in the implementation of American
foreign policy.
			
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
American security policy rests on a three-legged
stool consisting of defense, diplomacy, and development. As President Barack Obama implied in his May
2014 speech at West Point, New York, the United
States is in the midst of a resurgence of diplomacy
and development, as it seeks to leverage diplomatic
influence, foreign aid, and multilateral institutions
to solve the most vexing international security challenges. However, the dramatic rebalance toward diplomacy and development over the last several years
has largely failed. Rhetoric, official strategies, and actual policies have all aimed at rebalancing the three
legs of the foreign policy stool. However, several factors point to a continued militarization of U.S. foreign
policy, including funding levels, legal authorities,
and the growing body of evidence that civilian agencies of the U.S. Government lack the resources, skills,
and capabilities to achieve foreign policy objectives.
Continued reliance by senior decisionmakers at both
ends of Pennsylvania Avenue on the U.S. military in
the development, planning, and implementation of
U.S. foreign policy has significant implications. Foremost among them is the fact that the military itself
must prepare for a future not terribly unlike the very
recent past.
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THE REAL REBALANCING:
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE
TRAGEDY OF PRESIDENT OBAMA’S
FOREIGN POLICY
Mindful of the risks and costs of military action, we
are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world’s
many challenges.
		

President Barack Obama, March 28, 2011

The policy of pivoting—or rather, the rebalancing—to the Asia-Pacific has been described regularly
as President Obama’s “signature foreign policy initiative,” over the last 6 years. Launched in 2009 during his
first year in office and then refined through policy pronouncements such as the January 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance, the rebalance initiative has received much
attention from academics, practitioners, think tanks,
and the media. In reality though, the rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific has been more evolutionary than revolutionary, a shift in focus and grand strategy that began
well before President Obama’s first inauguration in
January 2009.
If there has been a revolutionary rebalancing underway during the Obama presidency, it has been his
effort to rebalance American foreign policy generally
from over-reliance on the military and toward greater
reliance on diplomacy and development. In rhetoric, official strategies, and policy implementation,
the Obama administration has strongly and repeatedly favored diplomatic solutions over military ones
during the last 6 years.
One of the primary hurdles in relying on diplomatic solutions is that they typically take longer to bear
fruit. In contrast, wielding military force often yields
results more quickly, even if the apparent success is
1

illusory in the long run. Critics of the Obama approach
conflate the emphasis on diplomacy with indecision,
and hence weakness. According to Danielle Pletka of
the conservative American Enterprise Institute, “This
president’s strategy has been retreat. Iraq: Retreat.
Afghanistan: Retreat. Total disengagement from the
world.”1
However, the tragedy of President Obama’s rebalance toward diplomacy and development is not
that it represents an America in retreat, but rather
that the rebalance has not succeeded. Despite unambiguous rhetoric, official pronouncements, and
policies all aimed at rebalancing toward diplomacy and development and away from defense,
in fact, there is much evidence to indicate that
U.S. foreign and national security policy remains
militarized, perhaps overly so.2
Regardless of whether militarization is good or
bad, the fact that U.S. foreign policy is likely to remain militarized, even beyond the Obama years, carries major implications for the U.S. military as well
as for those in the executive and legislative branches
that would seek to wield it. Facing the reality of an
American foreign policy still out of balance is merely
the first step in navigating the way forward. For its
part, the U.S. military must more firmly embrace its
role in shaping the security environment and preventing conflict by building security capacity and
capability among allies and partners.
The Resurgence of U.S. Diplomacy.
In the wake of two expensive, draining wars, American diplomacy is resurgent. Since his election in November 2008, President Obama has sought to rebalance
the three-legged stool of national security policy by
2

reducing the role of defense and strengthening the
role of diplomacy, as well as development.3
When President Obama entered office, reportedly
there were more musicians in the military bands than
there were U.S. diplomats.4 Given what appeared to be
an obvious imbalance toward the military dimension
of American foreign policy, the Obama administration
began a concerted effort to rebalance toward diplomacy and development. During the 2008 presidential
campaign, Candidate Obama promised to increase the
size of the Foreign Service, among other steps. After
assuming office, the new administration launched
an effort known as Diplomacy 3.0, the centerpiece of
which was the President’s hiring initiative, aimed at
expanding the Foreign Service by 25 percent by 2014.5
Nonetheless, the rhetoric on rebalancing the emphasis in American foreign policy has become particularly strong since the beginning of the President’s
second term and the end of major American involvement in Iraq.6 During the 2014 U.S. Military Academy
commencement ceremony in West Point, New York,
the President acknowledged American interests in a
world at peace, with greater freedom and tolerance,
but he firmly expressed his view that, “to say that we
have an interest in pursuing peace and freedom beyond our borders is not to say that every problem has
a military solution.”7 The President went on to note
that, “U.S. military action cannot be the only—or even
primary—component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does
not mean that every problem is a nail.”8
The President’s most senior defense advisor—the
Secretary of Defense—has been equally clear on the
need to balance toward diplomacy and development,
at the expense of relying routinely on military “solu-
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tions.” At the February 2014 Munich Security Conference, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel spoke
about his efforts with Secretary of State John Kerry to
restore “balance to the relationship between American
defense and diplomacy” over the preceding year.9 A
senior defense official traveling with Hagel in Munich
noted that the latter had come to believe, “that foreign
policy had become too militarized over the last decade
or so and that it’s time for [the Department of Defense,
DoD] to be [in] a supporting role when it comes to the
execution of this country’s foreign policy.”10
Of course, Kerry has been vocal as well on the need
to rebalance toward diplomacy and development.
During his confirmation hearing, he noted, “American
foreign policy is not defined by drones and deployments alone.”11 His predecessor, Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton, also pushed for a rebalancing toward diplomacy and development. The first
State Department budget request submitted to Congress under her tenure—for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010—
featured a 7 percent increase over 2009 levels. In testifying before Congress on the request, Clinton noted
that 2009—the height of the Great Recession—was an
inopportune time to ask for an increase in funding,
but she argued that it was necessary to have a “robust
State Department and [U.S. Agency for International
Development] working side-by-side with a strong
military in furtherance of our three Ds—diplomacy,
development, and defense.”12
Even though most of the rhetoric on rebalancing
from defense toward diplomacy and development
has seemed strongest since the beginning of President
Obama’s second term as president, the administration
has consistently promoted the rebalance through major policy pronouncements. For instance, in the 2010
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National Security Strategy (NSS), the administration
called repeatedly for all elements of American power
to be “balanced and integrated,”13 an implicit but obvious acknowledgement that the elements of power
were significantly out of balance. Additionally, the
2010 NSS called for diplomacy and development to be
“modernized,” on par with defense capabilities.
Within the State Department, Clinton initiated
the first ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) report, modeled on the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2010
QDDR was written to express broad functional and
administrative objectives and strategies, and to help
the State Department translate those things into budget priorities. In the opening pages of the QDDR,
Clinton was clear in comparing the document to the
QDR, and expressing her admiration of its ability to
set a strategic course, force prioritization, and capture
those priorities in budget requests.14 In her view, the
QDDR forms a critical tool in helping to “build up our
civilian power.”15
Most recently, the 2015 NSS echoed the 2010 NSS
in calling for a more balanced approach to American
national security, arguing that military force was not
the only tool available in the pursuit of U.S. interests.
“Rather,” states the 2015 NSS, “our first line of action
is principled and clear-eyed diplomacy, combined
with the central role of development.”16 Indeed, the
strategy is clear that when it comes to conflict prevention, defense plays a supporting role to diplomacy.17
In addition to policy pronouncements, there are
several practical examples that embody this shift in
emphasis and approach as well. First, President Obama
has been particularly keen on ending direct American
involvement in Iraq, and more recently Afghanistan.
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One of then-Senator Obama’s key campaign themes in
2008 was ending the war in Iraq. After becoming President in January 2009, he fulfilled that commitment in
relatively short order, removing major combat forces
from Iraq by December 2011. Failed negotiations over
a status of forces agreement (SOFA) are ostensibly the
reason why a residual U.S. force did not remain in Iraq
after 2011. However, a former senior administration
official—as well as the President’s political opponents
on Capitol Hill—argued that the White House did not
pressure Iraqi leadership enough and favored ending
American involvement above all else.18
The administration has been equally resolute in
bringing the war in Afghanistan to a close. Although
President Obama initiated a troop surge in Afghanistan in December 2009, less than a year after entering
office, he was keen to limit that surge in both scope and
duration.19 A year and a half after initiating the surge,
the President again spoke to the American people,
announcing the beginning of the surge’s drawdown
and the planned withdrawal of all remaining major
American combat forces by December 2014.20 Some
critics charged that the President’s announcement of
a specific end date would enable the Taliban to simply
wait out U.S. involvement.21 Nonetheless, the President was resolute in pursuing his preferred timeline,
rejecting advice from even some of his top civilian and
military advisors on the issue.22
The President also rejected the advice of some senior U.S. civilian and military advisors with regard to
American involvement in the Libyan civil war—but
in this situation, those top advisors, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposed U.S. military involvement in any form.23 Instead, with a United Nations
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(UN) mandate and strong leadership from American
allies and partners in Europe and the Middle East,
President Obama agreed to provide U.S. military forces in support. Initially led by France and the United
Kingdom (UK), the United States briefly held strategic
command—from March 19-31, 2011—before passing
leadership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and taking up a supporting role. The administration was said to have been “leading from behind,”
taking a back seat to European and allied efforts in
Libya. In fact, America’s NATO allies flew 85 percent
of the sorties in which munitions were dropped; provided the bases in France, Spain, Italy, and Greece
from which the attacks occurred; provided key command personnel; and supplied nearly all of the ships
that participated in the arms embargo on the regime
of Libyan Dictator Muammar Qaddafi.24
More recently, the United States has only reluctantly gotten involved in the Syrian civil war, despite
the huge number of civilian casualties and the massive refugee flows from Syria.25 President Obama
repeatedly has evinced a very clear preference for
diplomacy over military action in this instance, particularly when it came to responding to Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons: “I do not
believe that military action by those within Syria or by
external powers can achieve a lasting peace.”26 Separately, the President noted that a diplomatic solution,
“is overwhelmingly my preference.”27 Speaking more
broadly about how the United States would pursue
and protect its interests in the Middle East, the President also noted, “We can rarely achieve [U.S. national
security goals] through unilateral American action,
particularly through military action. Iraq shows us
that democracy cannot simply be imposed by force.”28
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With regard to Iran’s interest in developing a
nuclear weapon, the United States has also preferred
diplomatic means over military action. Starting in
2009, the Obama administration began an intensive
diplomatic effort to increase sanctions on Iran in concert with the European Union (EU) and other partners
such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia. Eventually,
the sanctions grew to include an EU ban on oil from
Iran and a freeze on the assets of Iran’s central bank,
amounting to the most stringent macroeconomic measures against Iran to date.29 While the administration
never took the threat of force off the table, its strategy
clearly favored diplomatic measures. Although such
measures arguably took significant time to pay dividends, they ultimately led to the first serious negotiations between senior U.S. and Iranian officials about
the disposition of existing nuclear infrastructure, materiel, and capability within Iran. Diplomatic efforts
intensified in 2013 when Kerry met with Iran’s foreign
minister in late September. In July 2015, negotiations
resulted in a historic agreement to end decades of economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for restrictions on its nuclear program.
In contrast to the two examples mentioned previously, the United States has obviously been wielding
military force in Iraq—indeed, this would appear to be
a case that contrasts with the notion of the Obama administration favoring diplomacy over military force in
recent years. However, American involvement came
only well after the security situation there deteriorated
significantly, as Islamic State (IS) extremists took over
Mosul (Iraq’s second largest city) and threatened the
stability of Iraqi Kurdistan as well as Baghdad itself.
Even as the United States began attacking IS targets
in Iraq, there was reportedly “deep unease” within
the White House over essentially bailing out the Iraqi
8

leadership in Baghdad.30 The administration’s strategy in Iraq—relying as it does on precision air strikes—
will certainly take longer to achieve significant results
to even come close to the President’s stated objective
of destroying IS.31 Nevertheless, such a strategy clearly precludes a lengthy ground war involving tens or
even hundreds of thousands of troops since the administration has been quite firm in its determination
to avoid the commitment of ground forces.
In some ways, the Obama administration’s use of
unmanned aerial vehicles—or drones—would also
appear to be an example of a preference for military
solutions to foreign policy problems. Indeed, the
Obama administration has made the use of unmanned
platforms in the prosecution of counterterrorism operations a signature aspect of its security policy.32
However, the expansive use of drones over the last 6
years does not evince a preference for military action
per se. Instead, it seems motivated at least in part by a
desire to avoid costlier, potentially bloodier, forms of
intervention and military involvement.33
Meanwhile, with regard to Ukraine, the administration has been careful to avoid overly militarizing
its response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its
invasion of the Donbas region.34 Since Ukraine is not
a treaty ally, the American response with regard to
the new government in Kyiv has been limited to providing nonlethal aid, technical assistance to improve
governance and energy security, and strong diplomatic support. At the same time, the United States and
the EU together have imposed an array of economic
sanctions on Russia. The only military dimension of
Washington’s policy has been to reassure treaty allies
Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with relatively
small-scale deployments of American troops—roughly 100-120 soldiers in each—and increased exercises in
9

the same countries conducted by U.S. forces based in
Europe as well as some rotationally deployed forces
from the continental United States. Throughout the
crisis though, President Obama has been clear in his
intention of avoiding a military confrontation with
Russia. “I will look at all additional options that are
available to us short of military confrontation,” the
President said during a news conference in January
2015, as the fighting between the Ukrainian army and
Russian-supported separatists flared anew.35
More broadly with regard to Russia, the Obama
administration began pursuing a diplomatic “reset”
shortly after entering office in January 2009 in an attempt to move beyond the East-West confrontation
over Moscow’s invasion and occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in August 2008. The administration hoped to restore diplomatic cooperation
with Russia along a number of avenues where there
appeared to be common interests, including nuclear
arms reductions, counterterrorism, and Iran’s nuclear
program.36 The reset achieved only limited success,37
in part because Moscow has chosen to employ military
force as a means of restoring Russian prestige, often
at the expense of Western interests. Meanwhile, the
United States has pursued a positive-sum game based
on cooperative diplomacy, a strategy that is only effective as long as both sides believe that a rising tide
lifts all boats.
Shortly after his reelection in November 2012, the
President initiated another reset of sorts, this time
with Israel.38 In March 2013, President Obama traveled
to Israel with the new Secretary of State, John Kerry,
in an effort to spur negotiations toward an agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Their
efforts represented the latest in a string of presidential attempts—mostly unsuccessful—stretching back
10

decades to build a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace
agreement. The odds of achieving success were again
stacked against the United States and the Obama administration, and yet the President committed Secretary Kerry to an exhausting shuttle diplomacy mission
that seemingly consumed the first year of Kerry’s tenure at Foggy Bottom. For a variety of reasons, some
far beyond the control of Washington, the entire effort
collapsed by April 2014.
Obviously, based on this example as well as several
of those noted previously, a resurgence of diplomacy
does not necessarily mean a resurgence of successful
diplomacy. Nevertheless, the evidence seems clear
that the Obama administration has labored through
word and deed to rebalance the U.S. Government’s approach toward achieving national security. National
security strategies, speeches by the most senior political leaders, and actual U.S. policies—many of which
were summarized previously—all point to an American administration less inclined to view every foreign
policy challenge as requiring a military response.
Have the Three Legs Been Rebalanced?
Aside from whether the renewed emphasis on diplomacy has improved American national security—
and the evidence there appears mixed, at least judging
from the examples of policy implementation discussed
earlier—the question of whether the administration
has, in fact, succeeded in its goal of rebalancing the
three legs of the national security stool remains. Ironically, it seems the resurgence in diplomacy has not
resulted in an equal balance between the three legs of
the national security stool. Just as a renewed emphasis on diplomacy does not necessarily mean successful
diplomacy, it also does not mean that the three legs of
11

the stool are yet equal or in relative balance. Indeed,
there is plenty of evidence to suggest that U.S. foreign
policy remains very—perhaps overly—militarized,
despite the best efforts of the last 6 to 7 years to shift
strategies, rhetoric, and policies.
The most obvious indicator of whether the national
security stool is still out of balance is federal spending.
It is nearly conventional wisdom these days that the
U.S. defense budget dwarfs that of every other discretionary federal function. Figure 1 shows the comparison between national defense and international affairs
expenditures in constant 2009 dollars dating back to
1977, the year the federal government moved to a fiscal year starting on October 1.39 Clearly, although defense expenditures appear to be heading downward
following a peak of nearly $700 billion in the middle
of the last decade, international affairs expenditures
have remained merely a fraction of national defense.

Figure 1. Comparison between National Defense
and International Affairs Expenditures in
2009 Dollars.
12

Some argue that the national security stool has
been out of balance for some time, certainly before the
wars of the early-21st century.40 Because of this, and
the massive disparity that has built up over time, it
is perhaps unreasonable to expect more than incremental or limited change over the last 6 years in the
broader, overall trend. When viewed in isolation, national defense expenditures appear indeed to be dropping significantly since 2010, as the administration
was still trying to end the war in Iraq and surging in
Afghanistan, but nonetheless on a trajectory to fall by
hundreds of billions of dollars in the coming years.
Given enough time, and commensurate increases in
international affairs funding, perhaps the legs of the
stool might achieve a greater degree of equality.
It seems though that the precipitous decline in defense spending witnessed over the last couple of years
is unlikely to continue. Figure 2, on the succeeding
page, includes not simply historical data but projected
future estimates as well.41 At least as far as the Pentagon and White House are concerned, the defense budget is expected to end its decline from wartime highs
and level off over the next several years.
Of course, figures for future years are obviously
just estimates drawn from DoD budget planning documents, subject to change depending on various factors,
including and especially Congress’s will. Historically
though, Congress rarely makes more than marginal
changes in the defense budget request submitted by
any administration. Even if Congress and the President were to force DoD to live within the more limited confines of the 2011 Budget Control Act—hence
sequestration—this would reduce the total Pentagon
budget by an additional 4.3 percent over the period
FY 16-19.42
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Figure 2. Historical Data and Projected
Future Estimates.
On the heels of what might be perceived as a significant drawdown in military power following wartime
highs, that 4.3 percent (or roughly $115 billion) would
represent significant lost defense investment, manpower, capability, infrastructure, and capacity. This
further downsizing of American military capability
would come at a time when many on both sides of
the political aisle believe the array of threats to U.S.
national security is growing, not diminishing.43 Nevertheless, even sequestration-level cuts would not
represent a revolutionary change in how the United
States achieves national security.
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Meanwhile, the future years estimate for the international affairs budget shows a slight increase in
2015 but then falls steadily thereafter.44 (See Figure 3.)
In sum, the available fiscal data paints a rather clear
picture—namely, that spending on diplomacy and
development combined amount to merely a fraction
of what the United States spends on national defense.
Even under sequestration scenarios, risk would surely
increase with decreased defense spending, but defense would just as surely still dominate relative to
diplomacy and development.

Figure 3. International Affairs Outlays,
FY 1999-2020.
In addition to federal budget appropriations, another important set of indicators of the ongoing militarization of U.S. national security policy are the various authorities granted to federal agencies. Take, for
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example, the case of train-and-equip military assistance programs. Over the last 10 years, DoD has seen
its authority in the area of military assistance programs, which are viewed as a subset of broader foreign
assistance efforts, grow substantially.
Since the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, and with the notable exception of the period
during the Vietnam War, the State Department has had
lead authority for providing oversight and guidance
for foreign military assistance program implementation, most of which has been carried out by DoD.45
This division of labor made sense insofar as it kept the
State Department in the lead for directing the thrust
and scope of foreign military assistance, while having
most of the detailed work on the ground implemented by the federal department most skilled in military
affairs: DoD.
Over the last 10-12 years, DoD has chipped away
somewhat at that division of labor. In the early-2000s,
and especially in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the United States became increasingly concerned with so-called “ungoverned spaces.”
Perhaps more accurately conceived of as “poorly governed spaces,” the phrase describes areas of the world
where legitimate political authorities have little to no
influence, giving nonstate actors—including violent
extremists—the room to operate and grow. In the
1990s, most of Afghanistan consisted of ungoverned
space, giving rise to al-Qaeda. In more recent years,
the Pan-Sahel region of Africa, parts of Yemen, and
the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan have all
been considered ungoverned spaces. Today, much of
Syria and large parts of Iraq can also be considered
ungoverned spaces.
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At about the same time that concern developed over
ungoverned spaces, DoD came to see (once again) that
military means alone would not provide lasting solutions to the security challenges facing the United States
in weak, failed, or defeated states such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military’s performance in ousting
the government and military of Saddam Hussein in
2003 was extraordinary—however, securing the peace
required more than columns of Abrams tanks or Bradley fighting vehicles. Specifically, developing a stable,
secure post-conflict environment required significant
indigenous security sector capabilities and capacity,
among other important governmental functions.46
Although building security sector capabilities and
capacity takes time, DoD officials, as well as some
members of Congress, perceived State Department
planning and implementation procedures under extant authorities as too slow and cumbersome.47 As a
result, in the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) proposed by then-President George W.
Bush, DoD asked for a new security cooperation authority that would enable it to train and equip foreign
security forces without having to rely on State Department processes and procedures. Congress subsequently modified that request significantly in the final
version of the FY 2006 NDAA that Bush ultimately
signed into law, but the result was to grant DoD the
authority to initiate train-and-equip security cooperation programs with foreign military forces. Nevertheless, in the conference report that accompanied the FY
2006 NDAA, Congress expressed its concern over the
risks in granting DoD authority in this way:
The conferees believe it is important that any changes
in statutory authorities for foreign military assistance
do not have unintended consequences for the effec17

tive coordination of U.S. foreign policy writ large, nor
should they detract from [DoD’s] focus on its core
responsibilities, particularly the warfighting tasks for
which it is uniquely suited.48

Because of its concern, Congress kept the funding for
this authority—known as “Section 1206 authority,”
for the section of the FY 2006 NDAA in which it appeared—initially capped at $200 million and valid for
just 2 years. A year later, Congress sought to modify
the authority slightly, by requiring the concurrence of
the Secretary of State for any programs undertaken by
DoD under Section 1206 auspices.
Since then, though, Section 1206 authority has been
consistently and regularly extended, in 1 or 2-year increments. To date, funding for Section 1206 programs
has amounted to roughly $2.2 billion, supporting security sector capabilities and capacity development
in over 40 countries.49 Senior military leaders have
repeatedly testified before Congress as to their assessment that Section 1206 authority has been one of
the most effective tools at the disposal of policymakers.50 Most recently, DoD requested, and the Congress
enacted, a provision to make Section 1206 authority
permanent as part of the FY 2015 NDAA. Although
the FY 2015 NDAA established a series of audits to
be conducted by the Government Accountability Office, the legislation essentially increased DoD’s Section 1206 authority by expanding the types of support
DoD can provide, by expanding the ways in which
recipient states may use U.S.-provided assistance, and
by essentially eliminating the annual funding cap.51
DoD has never received a separate appropriation for Section 1206 activities. Instead, it has had to
pull money from its Operations and Maintenance
appropriation to fund any activities under Section
1206 authorities. Moreover, Section 1206 is only one
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element of a much broader military and foreign assistance program. However, the case of Section 1206
is highly significant insofar as it represents one of the
first instances in half a century in which DoD has had
a leading role—admittedly with State Department
concurrence—in shaping security cooperation and ultimately foreign assistance. Rather than fading away
with the end of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the expanded role of DoD in security and foreign assistance
seems here to stay.
Finally, aside from more objective measures such
as the funding levels and authorities discussed earlier, there is a more subjective sense that the civilian
instruments of American foreign policy—particularly
the State Department and the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), but also other civilian federal agencies and departments that play
smaller roles in foreign policy formulation and implementation—simply lack the capacity, as well as perhaps the skills and knowledge, for the kinds of large
scale, complex challenges that have confronted U.S.
foreign policy in recent years. The most salient of these
challenges, particularly since the end of the Cold War,
has been the threat that failed, failing, or fragile states
pose to the international community generally and U.S.
interests specifically.
Since the turn of the 21st century, and arguably
since the early-1990s, the United States has recognized that some of the greatest security challenges of
the post-Cold War era would stem not from conquering states, but rather from failing ones.52 Such states
typically suffer from a host of security, governance,
fiscal, managerial, and organizational challenges, requiring a multifaceted solution. For this reason, the
United States and other developed countries have
pursued so-called “whole of government” approaches
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to failed, failing, or fragile states. A whole of government approach involves all relevant federal agencies
working across their respective bureaucratic boundaries in planning, coordinating, and implementing U.S.
foreign policy under the broad direction and guidance
of the State Department.
Despite the intuitive appeal of such a broad-based
approach, the U.S. record when it comes to implementing whole of government approaches has been
less than stellar.53 One prominent scholar has labeled
American reconstruction and stability efforts in Iraq
and Afghanistan as well as Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, and
Kosovo as “difficult, frustrating, and costly.”54 Another notes it, “is not—and will never be—a panacea.”55
Whole of government solutions received a particularly poor reputation following accounts of the inexperienced, largely untrained American civilians sent
to help bring governance, order, and stability to postwar Iraq.56 According to one observer:
They were astonishingly young. Many had never
worked abroad, few knew anything about the Middle
East. . . . Some were simply unqualified for their responsibilities. . . . Most of them didn’t even know what
they didn’t know.57

The same challenge existed in Afghanistan. Gates
observed:
Too little attention was paid to the shortage of civilian advisers and experts: to determining how many
people with the right skills were needed, to finding
such people, and to addressing the imbalance between
the number of U.S. civilians in Kabul and elsewhere in
the country.58
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These war time experiences have fueled perceptions
in the White House and in Congress that the military
may be more competent than civilian counterpart
agencies in fulfilling any number of national security
missions beyond purely military ones.59 However,
this problem is not new. Ironically, it was Gates who
testified that, “Congress has not been willing, decade
in and decade out, to provide the kind of resources,
people, and authority that it needs to play its proper
role in American foreign policy.”60
Part of the problem certainly stems from what
Gates cited—that is, chronic underfunding of the
State Department, and specifically a lack of sufficient
funding to operationalize fully State’s capability to
respond effectively and efficiently to major crises.61
Additionally, personnel practices have hindered the
effectiveness of the State Department and whole of
government solutions. For example, personnel turnover among U.S. civilians working in post-war Iraq
was extremely high, far higher than for the military
units sent there, which themselves were only on the
ground for 7 to 12 months. More broadly, according to
one former ambassador, the State Department simply
lacked enough personnel to accomplish their complex
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the personnel
that the State Department did have on hand lacked
the skills and training to do their jobs.62 When civilian
agencies lack the resources—such as enough trained
personnel—or otherwise have little ability to contribute to a whole of government solution, U.S. leaders
have often turned to the military to fill the gap.
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The Military Reaction.
Regardless of whether one views the continuing
militarization of U.S. foreign and national security
policy as good or bad, the reality for the Pentagon is
that this phenomenon is unlikely to change any time
soon. The fact that the Obama administration, which
has attempted mightily to engineer a rebalancing of
the three legs of the national security stool, has less
than 2 years remaining in office seems largely irrelevant to the situation facing the U.S. military today.
Given cuts in federal government spending in recent
years—with or without additional sequestration-level
cuts in the coming years—it seems unlikely that agencies such as the State Department will fill the gap any
time soon, that whole of government capabilities will
dramatically improve in the short to medium term, or
that DoD will see its appropriations and its authorities
altered in any major, significant way.
This reality carries several implications not just for
the U.S. military, but also for those that would seek to
wield it. With regard to the former, the U.S. military
services must embrace the security cooperation mission as a core task. To some degree, the U.S. Army
has taken preliminary steps in this direction. In 2014,
the Army added “engagement” to its list of warfighting functions, along with mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment,
and protection.63 This was a significant step forward,
considering that the Army has long displayed ambivalence at best and disdain at worst for security cooperation missions, believing they distract from troops’
preparedness for major combat operations.64
Additionally, the Army’s Strategic Guidance for Security Cooperation, also published in 2014, accurately
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conceptualizes security cooperation as a key tool for
the Army in terms of training, interoperability, and
military readiness. It recognizes that security cooperation helps in shaping, preventing, and winning
conflicts—that it helps assure allies, build interoperability for coalition operations, build partner capacity
and capability, and improve military readiness and
leader development. The military’s embrace of this at
an institutional level is relatively new, and continues
to evolve.65
Nonetheless, progress even at this level of strategic guidance—or in military parlance, the level of
doctrine—is inconsistent at best within DoD. On the
one hand, the Department acknowledged in 2005 that
military engagement missions were comparable with
combat missions.66 On the other, though, doctrine to
guide engagement and security cooperation is inconsistent across DoD.67 Moreover, some defense strategies and planning documents, as well as acquisition
programs on the books, indicate that the U.S. military
is still devoting most of its effort toward great power
conflict, rather than on shaping the security environment through security cooperation, security assistance, and military engagement.68
Where doctrine does exist and as the Army’s Strategic Guidance for Security Cooperation notes, the key
task ahead is to refine the concepts and institutionalize security cooperation across the military. This more
comprehensive embrace needs to happen in terms of
organizational structures, training, personnel policies,
acquisition, budgeting, and so forth. For example,
military personnel need to develop a more detailed
understanding of interagency partner contributions
as well as cultural or historical factors that may affect
mission success in particular countries or regions.69
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Unfortunately, a unit within the U.S. Army—the
162nd Training Brigade, based at Ft. Polk, LA—that
was created to train other Army units in just this sort
of knowledge was disestablished in 2014.
With regard to those that seek to wield the military
and its security cooperation capabilities, it would behoove policymakers to have a better sense of where
and when the application of military-led security
cooperation in support of U.S. foreign policy makes
sense and will be most effective. The recent collapse
of Iraqi army units facing IS militants north and west
of Baghdad, and the resulting fall of Mosul—a major
city in northern Iraq—raised serious questions about
the utility of having spent billions of dollars to train a
force that ultimately proved incapable and/or unwilling to safeguard Iraqi citizens and property.70
Meanwhile, the $8 billion spent by the United
States on security cooperation in Colombia, as part of
the “Plan Colombia” aid initiative, is largely viewed as
money well-spent.71 Colombia is not free of violence,
but it is far from the near-failed narco-state that some
feared it would become over a decade ago. These and
other examples of major security cooperation initiatives and programs can provide valuable cases from
which policymakers can gauge whether employing
the U.S. military in a security cooperation role is likely
to yield success, failure, or something in between.
Judging from just the two cases cited here, a key independent variable is the unmistakable existence of
parallel interests and policy preferences on the part of
the recipient state’s government and the vast majority
of its citizens.
Some studies dealing with security cooperation
have examined larger sets of cases, concluding that
the most important factors include not just parallel
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interests and policy preferences on the part of recipient governments and their citizens, but also consistent, long-term funding by donors; recipient capacity
and ability to absorb and utilize assistance; and donor
and recipient goal alignment.72 Indeed, the problem
does not appear to be a lack of recent scholarly focus
on and analysis of when and where DoD-led security
cooperation can be most effective.
Rather, what unfortunately seems to be the case
is that senior policymakers within both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government
have not yet internalized these lessons, or they are
perhaps unwilling to apply the lessons given other,
more pressing imperatives.73 If this is the case—that is,
if civilian policymakers ultimately make poor policy
choices that fly in the face of existing evidence—the
Pentagon is likely to be saddled with objectives that it
has only a very small chance of achieving.
At least in theory, it is possible that senior military
leaders, in providing their best military advice, could
advise top civilian policymakers regarding the low
odds of success in certain situations. However, the
“can-do” U.S. military culture makes this seem unlikely—instead, it seems more likely that the U.S. military will accept the mission and attempt to muddle
through.
Conclusion.
The dramatic rebalance toward diplomacy and
development over the last 6 years has largely failed.
Rhetoric, official strategies, and actual policies have
all aimed at rebalancing the three legs of the foreign
policy stool. However, several factors point to a continued militarization of U.S. foreign policy, includ-
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ing funding levels, legal authorities, and the growing
body of evidence that civilian agencies of the U.S.
Government lack the resources, skills, and capabilities
to achieve foreign policy objectives.
Continued reliance by senior decisionmakers at
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue on the U.S. military to develop, plan, and implement U.S. foreign
policy has significant implications. Foremost among
them is the fact that the military itself must prepare
for a future not terribly unlike the very recent past,
characterized by messy stability operations, hybrid
warfare, and disorder short of major interstate war.
The military is often faulted for preparing to fight the
last war. Currently, this is not the case, and the U.S.
military seems intent on returning to what it knows
and does best—handily vanquishing conventional
military adversaries. However, it is far more likely in
the coming years that civilian leaders will ask the military to become involved in messier, more nebulous
conflicts, which may or may not involve state actors.
The risk in an approach that emphasizes state adversaries and countering conventional military power
is that the U.S. military may be less ready, less capable, and/or poorly organized and structured to meet
national security requirements and the demands of
policymakers. In short, military power may not be as
easily wielded as it was in the middle of the 2000s. To
mitigate these risks, the military must further embrace
its role—in terms of doctrine, organization, training,
and so forth—in security cooperation, capacity building, security assistance, and stability operations so
that it is equipped, trained, organized, and prepared
for the most likely missions over the next decade.
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